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In the ﬁrst part of the paper I analyze a data set on teenage behavior.
The data is a sample of high school students in the Netherlands, and
contains information on teenage time use, income, expenditures, and
subjective measures of well-being and self-esteem. As all students in
a sampled class are interviewed in principle, the data set has rich
information on the behavior of potentially important peers of each
respondent. I estimate models to assess (bounds on) the magnitude
of endogenous social interactions. For some types of behavior (e.g.
truancy, smoking, pocket money, alcohol expenditures), endogenous
social interactions within school classes are strong; for other behaviors
they are moderate or unimportant. Within-gender interactions are
generally stronger than interactions between boys and girls, with some
intriguing exceptions.
In the second part of the paper I discuss a number of theories that
might help to understand the empirical patterns. Key concepts in the
discussion are interdependent preferences, endogenous social norms,
identity, and intergenerational interactions.
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21 Introduction
Economic aspects of teenage behavior can be studied from several perspec-
tives and with diﬀerent motivations.1 First, teenagers can be interesting from
a marketing perspective. Total expenditures by teenagers amount to several
percentages of GDP (cf. Warnaar and Van Praag, 1997) and in some markets
(e.g. designer clothing, cell phones, video games) teenagers are important
customers.
A second perspective (perhaps more appealing to population economists),
is public policy. Certain aspects of teenage behavior are a source of concern
to policy makers, teachers and parents: using drugs, dropping out of school,
teenage pregnancy, smoking cigarettes, and drinking alcohol are examples.
These behaviors bring health risks (such as alcohol related traﬃc accidents),
large social costs, and may have long-lasting eﬀects on individuals. Eﬀective
policies to inﬂuence these behaviors require a thorough understanding of
what teenagers prefer, what resources they have available, and how they
make their decisions.
Thirdly, teenage behavior is a natural area for empirical analyses of social
interactions, and therefore interesting from an intrinsic research perspective.
While teenage behavior is obviously also inﬂuenced by persons outside the
class, classmates are likely to play a potentially dominant role in shaping
teenagers’ preferences and behavior. In this paper I will use a school class
based data set in which all students within a sampled class are interviewed
in principle. As a result, the data set has unusually rich information on
members of a sampled individual’s reference group. This is in sharp contrast
with the situation when analyzing household surveys, which typically lack
explicit questions on the behavior of households in a household’s reference
group.
3The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data of the Dutch
National School Youth Survey. The survey contains information on teenage
time use, income, expenditures, and subjective measures of well-being and
self-esteem. Section 3 is an exploratory analysis of the data and estimates
simple reduced form models to measure the eﬀect of explanatory variables as
well as the strength of the within-class correlation of student behavior. Sec-
tion 4 reconsiders identiﬁcation issues and estimates a model that explicitly
allows for endogenous social interactions. Due to the cross-sectional nature
of the data I cannot fully control for all possible biases in the measurement of
endogenous social interaction eﬀects. Although I will argue that these biases
are likely to be small, the estimated eﬀects should be interpreted as upper
bounds on the true endogenous social interaction eﬀects.
I ﬁnd that for some aspects of teenage behavior (e.g. truancy, smok-
ing, pocket money, alcohol expenditures) social interaction eﬀects are strong,
while they are moderate or unimportant for other aspects of behavior. I also
estimate a version of the model that distinguishes between within-gender
and between-gender interactions. Within-gender interactions are generally
stronger than interactions between boys and girls, with some intriguing ex-
ceptions. Having jobs, going-out, smoking, drinking, and truancy show sim-
ilar empirical patterns suggesting that the concurrence of these behaviors
deﬁne a life style or identity. Sections 2, 3, and 4 ﬁt into an applied econo-
metrics literature that focuses on the measurement of social interactions (see
Duﬂo and Saez (2003), Durlauf and Moﬃtt (2003) and Kawaguchi (2004) for
some recent contributions).
In section 5, I review theories that may help to put the empirical results
into perspective. Key concepts are interdependent preferences, social norms,
identity, and intergenerational interactions. This section is related to a public
4economic theory literature, and also borrows from social psychology. A sketch
of possible routes for future research in section 6 concludes the paper.2
2 The Dutch National School Youth Survey
The empirical analysis is based on the Dutch National School Youth Survey
(NSYS). The ﬁrst NSYS survey took place in 1984 (ESPE’s ﬁrst president
Bernard van Praag being one of the initiators). The survey was held for
the second time in 1990, and has been repeated bi-annually since then. The
survey is a joint eﬀort of the Social and Cultural Planning Oﬃce of The
Netherlands (SCP) and the Netherlands Institute for Family Finance Infor-
mation (NIBUD). Each survey is based on a random sample of some 500
high school classes with approximately 12,000 students. A school that par-
ticipates is compensated by means of a report summarizing the survey results
for that school. The series of surveys is not a panel, although some schools
have participated more than once.
In principle all students in a sampled class participate in the survey. Yet,
some of them are excluded from the data, for example because a student was
absent on the day when the questionnaires were ﬁlled out. The survey con-
tains a wealth of information on economic, social, and psychological aspects
of teenage life. More speciﬁcally, I will look at how teenagers spend their
time, how they get money and how they spend it, and how they assess their
self-esteem and well-being, mainly using the 1992 data.3 There is limited
information on parents (education and working hours) and on siblings.
A US data set which is comparable to the present one is the National
Education and Longitudinal Study (NELS), see e.g. Gaviria and Raphael
(2001). Both the Dutch NSYS and the NELS focus on non-cognitive out-
comes within schools. The NELS is a biannual survey, ﬁrst held in 1988, and
5samples students within roughly 1000 schools. An important diﬀerence with
the Dutch NSYS is that the NELS surveys only a relatively small group of
students within each school. For example, in the 1990 sample used by Gaviria
and Raphael, the mean sample size per school was 13.3 students. While the
NELS contains information on school averages, these are not available per
class, grade, or gender. This limits the possibilities for an analysis of in-
teractions within schools (for example, it is impossible to allow for a school
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect) and it precludes any analysis of social interactions within
classes. Two other US data sets on teenagers with peer group information
are the Teenage Attitudes and Practices (TAPS) and the National Longitu-
dinal Survey of Youths (NLSY). However, the TAPS only contains subjective
information on a respondent’s four best same-sex friends, whereas the NLSY
only has subjective peer information based on questions of the type ”What
percentage of kids in your grade...?”.
Table 1 presents a number of sample statistics for the 1992 data. The
three by far most important time use categories for teenagers are sleep (59
hours per week, 8.4 hours per day), school (38 hours per week), and ”screens”
(a summary term for time spent on watching TV and video and using a
computer; 21 hours per week, 3 hours per day). Other categories are very
much smaller. The numbers refer to time spent during a ”normal school
week” (thus ”jobs” excludes time spent on vacation jobs). The expenditure
ﬁgures refer to the question ”How much do you spend on ... from your
own money” (thus, expenditures on teenage clothing directly by parents, for
example, are excluded). The measure of self-esteem is based on the following
six questions: 1) ”I sometimes think I will never be good at anything ”, 2)
”People like me have little chance to become successful in life ”, 3) ”I think
others ﬁnd me ugly ”, 4) ”I feel very insecure when I have to make a decision
6by myself ”, 5) ”I’m often afraid to fail ”, and 6) ”I often feel unsure when
I’m in company with others ”. The measure is deﬁned as six minus the
number of aﬃrmative answers to these questions. Thus the measure ranges
from 0 (aﬃrmative answers only) to 6 (no aﬃrmative answers). The measure
of well-being is based on the question: Considering everything, how do you
feel you are doing now? The possible answers (very good, good, fair, poor,
bad, very bad) have been linked to the numbers 6 to 1, respectively.
One diﬃculty with the data is caused by the fact that a large proportion
of teenagers – about 30 percent – do not know their parents’ education level.
Separating these percentages for boys and girls shows a remarkable gender
pattern of interactions between parents and children. With respect to father’s
education sons appear to be better informed than daughters (72 versus 66
percent). For mother’s education I ﬁnd the opposite: daughters are better
informed than sons (72 versus 68 percent). These results are in line with
those on gender patterns in parent-child interactions reported by Thomas
(1990). Given this data feature, one option is to exclude observations with
missing information on parental education levels. Another one is to include
these observations and perform an analysis without parental education as
explanatory variables. The empirical results reported below are based on the
ﬁrst option.
3 Reduced form regressions
As a ﬁrst step in the data analysis I have run a regression for each of the
eigthteen dependent variables: ten time use categories (sleep, eating/personal
care, school, jobs, household chores, going-out, ”screens”, reading, music, and
sports), two income variables (income from parents, income from jobs), three
expenditure categiories (clothing and shoes, cosmetics, and alcohol), savings,
7and two subjective measures (self-esteem and well-being).
The list of explanatory variables is largely determined by data availabil-
ity: a constant, gender, age, non-dutch, single-parent family, family size,
urbanization, the student’s school level, father’s and mother’s education, fa-
ther’s and mother’s weekly working time, and religion. Unfortunately, there
is no direct measure of family income in the data. As a consequence, co-
eﬃcients on father’s and mother’s education and hours of work may partly
reﬂect income eﬀects.
Let xik be a row vector of observable exogenous variables for individual
i in class k, i = 1,...,Nk, where Nk is the number of students in class
k; yik is the dependent variable. Let ik be an error term representing all
unobserved explanatory variables; ik is assumed to be independent of all
exogenous variables, and Eik = 0. The standard regression model
yik = xikβ + ik (1)
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where k = (1,...,Nk)0. In addition, I assume cov(k,`) = 0, ...,k 6= `,
i.e. error terms of two students who are from diﬀerent classes are assumed
to be 0.4
A signiﬁcant correlation coeﬃcient indicates the presence of some kind of
interdependence in the behavior of classmates. There may be unmeasured
explanatory variables that aﬀect each student within a class, for example the
8behavior of teachers, school policies, or similar family and cognitive back-
grounds that have selected the students into the same class. There may also
be a correlation if there are endogenous social eﬀects (that have not yet been
modeled explicitly).
3.1 Results: explanatory variables
Before looking at the estimates of the within-class correlation coeﬃcients in
detail, I discuss the eﬀects of the explanatory variables. I choose to do so by
explanatory variable (tables 2, 3, 4, and 5).
Gender
Girls spend more time on school, household chores, sleep, and personal
care and eating than boys do. The diﬀerences, however, are not very large:
at most one hour per week per category (but slightly more than one hour
per week for time spent on school). The time use categories on which girls
(necessarily) spend less time than boys are jobs, sports, and time spent on
“screens” (TV, video, and computer). The diﬀerence for the latter category
is large and highly signiﬁcant: boys spend two hours per week more in front
of screens than do girls.
Parents do not discriminate between boys and girls in terms of the amount
of money they give to their children: the girl dummy is insigniﬁcant in the
income-from-parents regression. But it is not in the income-from-jobs re-
gression. Girls earn about 25 percent less than boys from jobs, slightly more
than the diﬀerence in time spent on jobs. Yet, girls spend 50 percent more
on clothing than boys, a gender eﬀect also found for single adults in a dif-
ferent study (Kooreman, 2000). Expenditures on alcohol also show a very
strong gender eﬀect, but now with the opposite sign: boys spend twice as
9much on alcohol than girls. Alcohol expenditures are substantially lower for
non-Dutch teenagers. Girls save about 30 percent less than boys.
Gender has a large eﬀect on self-esteem. On the 0 to 6 scale, girls have a
0.5 lower score of self-esteem, and the eﬀect is statistically very signiﬁcant.
The eﬀect of gender on well-being is not signiﬁcant. (Self-esteem and well-
being are obviously related, but well-being is a broader concept that involves
more than self-esteem.)
Single-parent families
Teenagers in single parent households spend (much) more time on house-
hold chores (almost two hours per week more), but also on personal care and
going out. This seems to come at the expense of sleep. Teenagers from a
single-parent family get about 50 percent more money from the parent than
teenagers in two-parent families. Perhaps this indicates that a teenager in a
single parent family is required or supposed to behave more independently
than peers from otherwise identical families. Alternatively, it might be a
compensation for the time spent on household chores. This interpretation
would imply an implicit wage rate of 6 guilders for an extra hour of household
chores.5 Girls in single-parent families spend more on clothing and cosmetics
than girls in otherwise identical two-parent families. Being in a single par-
ent family also has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on well-being, but there is
no eﬀect on self-esteem. Living with only a single parent also increases the
teenager’s probability to own a cell phone.6
School level
The school level has a very large impact on time use. Compared to
students in a vocational program, students in VWO (giving access to college
and university) spend four hours per week more on school. They spend less
10time on jobs, household chores, going out, screens, and sleep. School level
does not have an eﬀect on the amount of money teenagers receive from their
parents, but income from jobs strongly decreases with school level (consistent
with the result found for time spent on jobs). This eﬀect on income is
reﬂected in expenditure patterns, in particular alcohol expenditure, savings,
and moped ownership. An intriguing result is that school level has a positive
eﬀect on self-esteem, and a negative eﬀect on well-being. Apparently, a higher
school level has a beneﬁt (self-esteem), but the price is high (time spent on
school).
Father’s and mother’s hours of work and education level
Father’s and mother’s hours of work have a positive eﬀect on the time the
teenager spends on going out, on jobs, and on alcohol expenditures. This
may represent an income eﬀect, or it might be related to lower parental
attention. For a number of other behaviors I do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
mother’s working hours and insigniﬁcant eﬀects for father’s working hours.
Examples are expenditures on clothing, cosmetics, and savings, and income
from parents. These diﬀerences again may point at a labeling eﬀect: The
marginal propensity to spend money on the children out of mother’s income is
(much) larger than the marginal propensity to spend money on the children
out of father’s income (cf. Kooreman, 2000). Similar asymmetric eﬀects
of father’s and mother’s working time are found for truancy, smoking, cell
phone ownership, and time spent on household chores. The insigniﬁcance of
the eﬀect of father’s working time may be related to its smaller variance in
the data set.
Variables that have a strong positive eﬀect on self-esteem are the student’s
school level and the father’s education level. The eﬀect of the mother’s
11education level on self-esteem is not signiﬁcant, and interaction coeﬃcients
(not reported) indicate that the eﬀects of parental education level are the
same for boys and girls.
Family size
Students from large families spend more time on jobs and household
chores, and less on screens and sports. Children from smaller families have
higher self-esteem.
Urbanization
Urbanization (ranging from 1 (large city) to 5 (rural area)) has a signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect on time spent on TV, video, and computer: a teenager in a large
city spends almost two hours per week more on screens than a teenager in a
rural area. Teenagers in large cities spend more on clothing and shoes than
those in rural areas.
Religion
Religion does not have much of an eﬀect on time use. An exception is the
negative eﬀect of being Protestant on time spent on screens and the positive
eﬀect on reading.
Age
Both income sources strongly increase with age, especially income from
jobs. There is a signiﬁcant decrease in well-being when the teenager grows
older, but self-esteem – on the other hand – does not relate to age.
123.2 Results: within-class correlations
We now turn to the estimated within-class correlation coeﬃcients for the var-
ious time use categories. The largest correlation coeﬃcient – the one for time
spent on school – is 0.12, which means that 12 percent of the unexplained
variance in the regressions can be attributed to factors common to all stu-
dents within the class. Of course, it is plausible to ﬁnd a positive correlation
for an activity closely related to school. Other categories where I ﬁnd signiﬁ-
cant within-class correlations are jobs, going out, “screens”, and sports. The
signiﬁcant positive correlation for sleep might be due to the time adding-up
constraint. A more interesting question is whether there is also a correla-
tion for activities unrelated or remotely related to school. A correlation in
that case could be an indication for selection eﬀects into classes related to a
similarity in socioeconomic backgrounds of families. However, for time use
categories far away from school I ﬁnd the correlations to be essentially zero.
Examples are household chores, personal care, music, and reading.
For both income sources there is a signiﬁcant within-class correlation
coeﬃcient, but the coeﬃcient for income from parents is twice as large as the
coeﬃcient for income from jobs (0.059 versus 0.029).
Looking at the within-class correlations for expenditures, the largest cor-
relation is found for alcohol expenditures, 0.056, and the second largest for
clothing expenditures, 0.019. Both these correlation coeﬃcients are signiﬁ-
cant. The correlation coeﬃcient for savings is insigniﬁcant.
The intra-class correlation coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant for self-
esteem and insigniﬁcant for well-being. These results suggest that self-esteem
is primarily tied to the school and the class, whereas well-being is also related
to the family and the home environment.
134 Endogenous social interactions
In order to get a better picture of the possible mechanisms behind these cor-
relations, I estimate a model which explicitly allows for endogenous social
interactions. Section 4.1 presents the model and reconsiders some identiﬁca-
tion issues, followed by the presentation of the empirical results in section 4.2.
Section 4.3 extends earlier work by making a distinction between interactions
within and across genders.
4.1 Some identiﬁcation issues reconsidered
Consider the model















A positive γ reﬂects an inclination to conform to the behavior of others, a
negative γ an inclination to deviate from the behavior of others.
It turns out convenient to rewrite (1) in matrix notation as

























Let A ≡ (I − Γ)−1. The reduced form of (2),
yk = AXkβ + A ˜ Xkδ + Ak, (3)
14will be the basis for estimation. Note from (3) that if γ 6= 0, the reduced
form error terms within a class (i.e. elements of vk ≡ Ak) will be correlated
even if ρ = 0.
The estimation algorithm explicitly evaluates the reduced form (the social
equilibrium). The parameters are then estimated by maximum likelihood,
assuming that each k follows a multivariate normal distribution with the
same correlation structure as in section 3.
A number of papers, notably those by Manski (1993 and 2000) describe
potential caveats in the identiﬁcation of social interactions. Given the na-
ture of the present data I will not be able to fully account for all of these
problems. In order to provide a proper perspective for the interpretation of
the empirical results to be presented, I will discuss identiﬁcation problems
in relation to the present data set: i) the deﬁnition of the reference group,
ii) non-random selection into reference groups, iii) simultaneity of mutual
endogenous interaction eﬀects, and iv) the discrete nature of some of the
endogenous variables.
The deﬁnition of the reference group
One of the methodological problems in analyses of social interactions is
how to deﬁne a reference (social) group: the group of individuals who aﬀect
the behavior of a given individual. A number of authors have deﬁned the
reference group of an individual as the group of all persons in the popula-
tion within the same age group and with the same education level, and used
the sample analogues as an approximation; see e.g. Kapteyn et. al (1997)
and Aronsson et al. (1999). This is a crude deﬁnition, largely motivated
by data limitations. A more attractive alternative is to use subjective in-
15formation on an individual’s reference group, as in Woittiez and Kapteyn
(1998). However, the information on the reference group of a sampled indi-
vidual is often limited as these reference group members are not themselves
included in the sample. The data in the current analysis can be viewed as
a reference group based sample as all students within a sampled class are
interviewed in principle. While teenage behavior is obviously also inﬂuenced
by persons outside the class, classmates play a potentially dominant role
in shaping teenagers’ preferences and behavior. On a weekday, the average
student spends about six hours in his or her school class. The total time
spent on school related activities (including homework and commuting) is
about eight hours per weekday, more than ﬁfty percent of the daily waking
time. Teenagers within the same school or class therefore form social groups
that are more clearly deﬁned and delineated than in many other situations
in which social interactions are likely to play a role.
Non-random selection into reference groups
In The Netherlands high schools are state-funded and there are no re-
strictions in terms of catchment areas. In practice, school choice is based on
geographic proximity, (religious) denomination, type of education (level and
pedagogical principles), and (perceived) school quality. Conditional on school
choice, selection into classes is primarily based on cognitive abilities. In the
regressions reported below, the level of education is one of the explanatory
variables. In combination with allowing for within-class correlation of error
terms, this controls for non-random selection into classes to some extent. I
also report some results on models with school speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, which
controls for non-random selection into school to some extent.
Simultaneity of mutual endogenous social interaction eﬀects
16Equation (2) can be interpreted as a reaction function. Due to its linearity
there is a unique (Nash) equilibrium (provided that I − Γ is non-singular).
The identiﬁcation problem is now is whether one can uniquely solve the
structural parameters β, γ, and δ from the reduced form parameters. It
is well-known that this is generally impossible without imposing a priori
restrictions on the parameters. Without such restrictions, one can identify
whether social interactions are present, but it is impossible to distinguish
between endogenous social interactions and social interactions of other types.
In practical applications there often are credible parameter restrictions.
For example, it is diﬃcult to see why the income of the parents of student
j would have a direct eﬀect on the pocket money student i receives from
her parents. If we would ﬁnd, in a reduced form analysis, that there is a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of the income of the parents of student j on the amount of
pocket money student i receives from her parents, then the only plausible
explanation seems to be that this is an indirect eﬀect that runs via the pocket
money of student j. Note also that for identiﬁcation it is suﬃcient that there
is only a single exogenous variable of student j that does not have a direct
eﬀect on the dependent variable of student i.
Gaviria and Raphael (2001) argue that students are less exposed to the
family background of their school peers than they are exposed to the family
background of peers residing in the same neighborhood. They conjecture that
in an analysis of interactions through schools contextual eﬀects (measured
by the parameter δ in equation (2)) are less important than in an analysis
of interactions through neighborhoods. In their empirical analysis they as-
sume that contextual eﬀects are absent (δ = 0). Kawaguchi (2003) invokes
subjective information about the perception of peer behaviors to achieve full
identiﬁcation.7 He ﬁnds that the absence of contextual eﬀects (δ = 0) cannot
17be rejected. The empirical results presented below are based on the assump-
tion that there are no contextual eﬀects. The estimates on the endogenous
social interaction eﬀects should therefore be interpreted as upper bounds on
the true eﬀects.8
Discrete nature of endogenous variables
Several of the endogenous variables I consider are discrete (or mixed
discrete-continuous), e.g. cell phone ownership, smoking, and drinking al-
cohol. In these cases there may exist multiple (Nash) equilibria. The estima-
tion procedure used in those cases is described in Soetevent and Kooreman
(2004).
4.2 Results
Regarding time use strong endogenous interactions are found for time spent
on school and for jobs (table 6). Both coeﬃcients are close to 0.25, imply-
ing a multiplier of 1.33 (i.e. if some exogenous force initially increases the
time each student spends on school by x percent, then the increase in time
spent on school in equilibrium will be 1.33 times x on average, due to social
interactions; similarly for jobs). The endogenous interaction eﬀects are also
signiﬁcant for time spent on “screens”, sports, and going-out. The coeﬃ-
cients are about 0.15, implying a multiplier of 1.18. The two largest of all
estimated endogenous interaction coeﬃcients are those for income from par-
ents (0.341, t-value 5.8) and alcohol expenditures (0.309, t-value 7.0). The
implied multipliers are 1.52 and 1.45, respectively. Signiﬁcant but smaller
eﬀects are also found for income from jobs and for expenditures on clothing.
For savings the endogenous interaction coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant.
The only negative estimated endogenous interaction coeﬃcient is found
18for self-esteem, suggesting that self-esteem of a student goes at the expense
of the self-esteem of others in the class. The coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant,
however. For well-being the coeﬃcient is 0.171 (t-value 2.7), implying a
multiplier of 1.21.
4.3 Within-gender versus cross-gender interactions
In the most general speciﬁcation, interactions within a class are represented
by an arbitrary Nk ×Nk interaction matrix Γ, where element (i,j) measures
the eﬀect of student j on student i (diagonal elements are 0). The results
presented above were based on the assumption that all non-diagonal elements
were equal and dependent on only a single parameter, γ. Obviously, there are
possibilities for relaxing this symmetry assumption. A ﬁrst one that comes
to mind is a reﬁnement based on the boy-girl distinction. Then the elements
of the interaction matrix could be speciﬁed as:
γij =

    
    
γBB/(Nk − 1) if both i and j are boys
γBG/(Nk − 1) if i is a boy and j is a girl
γGB/(Nk − 1) if i is a girl and j is a boy
γGG/(Nk − 1) if both i and j are girls
(4)
Thus, this speciﬁcation distinguishes between within-gender and cross-gender
interactions: γBB measures how a boy is aﬀected by other boys, and γBG
measures how a boy is aﬀected by girls; γGB measures how a girl is aﬀected
by boys, and γGG measures how a girl is aﬀected by other girls.
Table 8 presents the estimation results for this speciﬁcation of the inter-
action matrix. Within-gender interactions for boys are particularly strong
for time spent on jobs, for income from jobs as well as for income from
parents, and for alcohol expenditures. For girls I ﬁnd strong within-gender
interactions for time spent on jobs, and for alcohol expenditures. Most of
19the cross-gender interactions are asymmetric: the eﬀect of girls on boys is
generally larger than the eﬀect of boys on girls.
A particularly remarkable pattern appears for alcohol expenditures: The
cross-gender interactions are larger in magnitude than the within-gender in-
teractions and the cross-gender interactions have diﬀerent signs. Alcohol
expenditures by boys are extremely responsive to alcohol expenditures by
girls with a coeﬃcient larger than 1. However, the more boys spend on al-
cohol, the lower the alcohol expenditures by girls. One story that would be
consistent with this pattern is that boys pay for girls’ drinks (note that the
boys have more money available). In the model without social interactions
I found a highly signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient on the girl dummy variable,
implying that girls spend about half as much on alcohol as do boys. This is a
result that has been reported in the literature numerous times; e.g. Gaviria
and Raphael (2001) and Dee and Evans (2003). In the present model, al-
lowing for diﬀerences between within-gender and cross-gender interactions,
the negative coeﬃcient on the girl dummy (not reported) disappears (in fact
it turns positive). This implies that in terms of the individual inclination
to spend money on alcohol, there is no diﬀerence between boys and girls.
(In fact, girls would spend slightly more than boys if each of them made
his/her decision in isolation.) It is the gender pattern of social interactions
that causes boys to spend twice as much on alcohol as do girls, in the social
equilibrium.
The last column in table 8 reports p-values for testing γBB = γBG =
γGB = γGG. At the 1 percent signiﬁcance level, the hypothesis is rejected for
time spent on jobs, income from jobs, and alcohol expenditures; at the 10
percent level it is also rejected for time spent on going out. Soetevent and
Kooreman (2004) ﬁnd similar results for smoking and truancy. For the other
20types of behavior the hypothesis cannot be rejected. Thus jobs, income from
jobs, going-out, smoking, drinking, and truancy show a coherent pattern
of relatively strong and non-trivial social interactions within and between
genders. This pattern also suggest that eﬀective policy aimed at discouraging
smoking, for example, should not merely focus on smoking but more generally
on a life style of which smoking is only one aspect.
Recall that the results – while consistent with endogenous social inter-
actions – do not formally establish their presence. However, many of the
empirical results seem diﬃcult to explain through another mechanism than
endogenous social interaction, in particular the asymmetry in the boy-girls
interactions.
Obviously, one could in principle reﬁne the speciﬁcation of the interaction
matrix beyond the boy-girl distinction, for example on the basis of ethnicity,
or by allowing the eﬀects of younger and of older classmates to be diﬀer-
ent. The interactions could in principle be completely idiosyncratic. Some
students – say leaders – might act completely independently of others. In
the matrix Γ the row of such a student would merely contain zeros. The
individual characteristics related to such independent behavior may be un-
observable. This suggests a speciﬁcation that allows for random variation in
the parameters of the interaction matrix. Such reﬁnements are left for future
research.
Table 9 reviews some of the results from Soetevent and Kooreman (2004)
for the discrete choice analogue of the model, with school speciﬁc ﬁxed ef-
fects. The strongest endogenous social interactions are found for truancy,
somewhat more moderate eﬀects for smoking, cell phone ownership, and
moped ownership, and weak eﬀects for asking parent’s permission for pur-
chases. Thus endogenous social interactions are strong for behaviors closely
21related to school (truancy), moderate for behavior partly related to school
(smoking, cell phone and moped ownership), and weak for behavior far away
from school. Again, within-gender interactions are stronger than interactions
between genders. An exception here is moped ownership: for a boy the prob-
ability of moped ownership is strongly aﬀected by moped ownership of other
boys and of girls. Moped ownership of girls, on the other hand, is not af-
fected by endogenous social interactions. Note that for cell phone ownership
intra-girl interactions are stronger than intra-boy interactions.
In order to gain some insight in the magnitude of the social interaction
eﬀects implied by the estimated γ’s consider a reference class (largely based
on median values of exogenous variables). This is a hypothetical MAVO
class composed of 8 girls and 8 boys; all of them are aged 14, Dutch, non-
protestant, non-catholic, and come from a two-parent household with a father
working 36 hours per week and a mother working 16 hours per week. The
estimated parameters imply that in equilibrium the expected number of tru-
anters is 3.14 (the probability of truancy is 0.191 for girls and 0.201 for boys).
Now suppose that a surely truanting girl is added to this class (i.e. we add
a girl with characteristics such that her probability of truancy is virtually
equal to 1, irrespective of the behavior of others). Without social interaction
eﬀects, the expected fraction of truanters would rise from 0.196 (3.14/16) to
0.244 (4.14/17), a 24 percent increase. Taking social interaction eﬀects into
account, the new equilibrium fraction of truanters rises to 0.278 (4.73/17),
an increase of 41 percent compared to the original level. The model also
implies that a change in the value of an exogenous variable of only one of the
pupils in principle aﬀects the behavior of all pupils in class.
225 Theories related to teenage behavior
Which theories – or elements of theories – can help us to explain the empirical
patterns shown here? The standard economic theory of investment in human
capital is most closely related to ”time spent on school” and ”truancy”. In the
investment model students make a trade-oﬀ between higher eﬀort now and
higher expected future wages, or more current leisure and lower future wages.
In a simple version of this model a student will spend more time on school
the higher the future wages. The fact that students with higher school level
(higher ability) spend more time on school and are less frequent truants is
consistent with this prediction. Many of the other ﬁndings, however, cannot
be explained easily along similar lines.
This section ﬁrst looks at four categories of explanations for endogenous
social interactions (or peer eﬀects): i) interdependent resources, ii) interde-
pendent preferences, iii) the theory of identity, and iv) endogenous social
norm theory. This list is incomplete, and an eclectic selection from the liter-
ature. I am not aware of any behavioral theories that motivate the existence
of exogenous social interactions.
5.1 Interdependent resources
A simple explanation for endogenous social interactions is the existence of a
common resource constraint. In that case the share a student gets from a
pie of given size depends negatively on the shares obtained by other students
due to the adding-up constraint. In the behaviors considered in the previous
sections, there is no such common resource constraint, except - perhaps –
in the case of self-esteem. If self-esteem is purely a matter of ranking in-
dividuals within a school class, the total ”amount” of self-esteem is given,
and a negative endogenous social interaction eﬀect will result. Note that the
23coeﬃcient for self-esteem was negative but insigniﬁcant.
5.2 Interdependent preferences
A straightforward way to incorporate social interactions in models of con-
sumption and time allocation is by making the parameters of the utility
function dependent on the choices of other individuals. An early example in
which this idea is formalized is Pollak (1976).
Consider the following stripped-down version with only two consumers
and two goods. Consumer 1 has income I1; he spends y1 on the ﬁrst good
and the remainder of his income, I1 − y1, on the second good. Consumer 2
has income I2; she spends y2 on the ﬁrst good and the rest of her income,
I2 − y2, on the second good. Let us specify the utility functions as

U1 = αln(y1 − γy2) + (1 − α)ln(I1 − y1)
U2 = αln(y2 − γy1) + (1 − α)ln(I2 − y2) (5)
with 0 < α < 1 and γ not too large. Thus, the utility of consumer 1
depends not only on his own consumption of both goods, it also depends on
how much the other person consumes of the ﬁrst good. If the parameter γ is
positive, there is a negative consumption externality. Maximization of (4a)
by consumer 1 yields the optimal y1 as a function of y2:
y1 = αI1 + (1 − α)γy2 (6)
Similarly, I have for consumer 2
y2 = αI2 + (1 − α)γy1 (7)




αI1 + (1 − α)γI2




αI2 + (1 − α)γI1
1 − (1 − α)2γ2 (9)
24Without interdependent preferences (γ = 0), both consumers spend a
fraction α of their income on the ﬁrst good. Thus, with negative consump-
tion externalities (γ > 0), they spend more on the conspicuous (ﬁrst) good,
and less on the non-conspicuous (second) good, compared to the case where
interdependent preferences are absent.
This simple model reveals another important assumption usually made
implicitly in the empirical literature on social interactions, namely the as-
sumption that observed behavior is a Nash equilibrium. Consider the case
where preferences are still given by (4) with γ > 0, but now the consumers
coordinate their decisions and jointly decide that each of them spends a frac-
tion α of income on the ﬁrst good. It can be shown that in that case both
consumers are better oﬀ than in the Nash equilibrium. Now suppose that
a sample of consumer pairs would be available to estimate (7). If within
each pair consumers cooperatively choose this Pareto improvement over the
Nash equilibrium, the regression coeﬃcient on the income of the other per-
son would be insigniﬁcant. The example shows that it would be wrong to
conclude that preferences are not interdependent.
The model also implies that if consumers actually behave Nash, then
Pareto improvements can be induced by taxing the conspicuous (ﬁrst) good
and subsidizing the non-conspicuous (second) good. In the model there is no
diﬀerence between physical negative externalities such as cigarette smoke or
noise on the one hand, and negative externalities through human emotions
such as envy on the other hand. Empirical evidence on this type of prefer-
ence interdependence hence provides a welfare theoretic motivation for taxing
such conspicuous goods, in addition to the more traditional arguments for
taxation; see Kooreman and Schoonbeek (2004) for details and extensions.
255.3 Endogenous social norms
Another central concept in theoretical models on social interactions is a
”norm”. Essentially, a norm is an equilibrium phenomenon that arises be-
cause deviations from it are penalized and conformist behavior rewarded.
Thus, social norms are endogenous. An interesting recent paper in which
social norms are made explicit is Castronova (2003). Castronova presents an
empirical study on social norms and sexual activity in US high schools. In
his model, there is not only the binary choice of sexual activity; for those
who choose not to be sexually active, there is the decision to be punitive
or not with respect to those who are active, and with respect to those who
do not punish. There is a cost of imposing stigma on others and there is
a cost of having stigma imposed. In Castronova’s model two types of Nash
equilibria can occur, a punitive and a permissive equilibrium. In the punitive
equilibrium, those whose are sexually active are being stigmatized by those
who are not; in the permissive equilibrium the fraction of sexually active
students is larger than in the punitive one, and those who are not active do
not stigmatize. The model can explain why behavior and norms may vary
substantially across otherwise similar schools.
5.4 Theories of identity
Akerlof and Kranton (2002) have summarized and formalized some sociolog-
ical theories on student behavior and schools. A central concept in these
theories is identity. In the standard human capital model applied to the ex-
planation of student eﬀort, a student makes a trade-oﬀ between higher eﬀort
and higher future wages on the one hand, and more current leisure and lower
future wages on the other hand (cf. Burgess et al. (2002)). In the theory
of identity a student maximizes utility by making two choices. He chooses
26his eﬀort in school and he chooses his social category, e.g. jocks or nerds.
In doing so he considers the match between his own actions and the ideal
behavior of the chosen category. In this model a student may exert low levels
of eﬀort (or show other forms of vice behavior) in order to avoid a loss of
self-image.
Is identity a just term that summarizes certain patterns of individual
preferences and resources, or does it contain information in addition to that?
For example, there may be no such thing as a group of nerds; those who
are called nerds may just be those who are smarter and more academically
inclined. The theory assumes that these groups exist, that they are clearly
delineated, and that there is consensus among teenagers about who belongs
to which group. Whether identity is a useful concept for empirical research
is an open question.
5.5 Intergenerational interactions
A ﬁnal piece of explanation for teenage behavior I will discuss is related to
intergenerational interactions. In addition to the eﬀects of parental work-
ing time reported here, a number of authors report recent evidence on a
direct, causal relationship between maternal and paternal employment and
children’s’ cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes. An example in the non-
cognitive domain is Anderson, Butcher, and Levine (2003), who provide
evidence of a causal relationship between maternal employment and child
overweight. These authors argue that time constraints of the mother aﬀects
her ability to monitor and supervise the child’s nutritional intake and energy
expenditure. (Again, the fact that the behavior of fathers is seemingly irrel-
evant might be related to the smaller variation in father’s working hours in
the data.)
27Another notable paper in this respect is Haisken-DeNew and Bantle
(2002). These authors show that – compared to the case with two non-
smoking parents – the smoking probability of a teenager more than doubles
if one of the parents smokes; if both parents smoke, the smoking probability
triples (compared to the case with two non-smoking parents). As a conse-
quence, policies targeted at reducing smoking by youths may fail or will be
less eﬀective if parents’ behavior is not taken into account.
Just as teenagers react to their parents, parents’ behavior is likely to be
aﬀected by their teenagers’ behavior. For example, a mother may decide to
reduce her working hours if her child is a frequent truant; cf. Hill, Xeung,
and Duncan (2001). Note that this eﬀect implies a negative relationship
between mother’s working hours and truancy. The fact that I ﬁnd a positive
relationship in the data suggests that the ﬁrst eﬀect – the eﬀect of mother’s
working hours on the teenager’s truancy – is the stronger one; see also Liu,
Mroz and Van der Klaauw (2003), who focus on parental responses to a
child’s cognitive outcomes.9
6 Conclusion
The simultaneous attention to a large number of aspects of teenage behavior
– time, money, peers, and parents – in a single paper precludes an in-depth
analysis of each of them. At the same time, the “broad” approach reveals
interrelated patterns of behaviors which helps to understand the separate
aspects. Smoking, drinking, truancy, going-out, and having a job appear to
be closely related aspects of teenage behavior. One interpretation is that
the concurrence of these behaviors deﬁne a “lifestyle” or “identity”, a latent
variable on the basis of which social groups are formed and delineated. This
ﬁnding suggests that a policy targeted at reducing teenage smoking, for ex-
28ample, might be more eﬀective if it addresses the life style of which smoking
is one aspect, rather than by addressing smoking in isolation.
The explicit distinction between endogenous social interactions within
genders and those between genders shows that the former is generally stronger
than the latter, but also that there are notable exceptions. For alcohol, the
gender based distinction of interaction types reveals an asymmetric gender
pattern that causes boys to spend twice as much on alcohol as girls.
The empirical results are subject to qualiﬁcations regarding the identi-
ﬁcation assumptions. As emphasized by Manski and others, increasing the
credibility of empirical results on social interactions is to a large extent a
matter of the availability of appropriate data. Within the context of teenage
behavior, we would like to be able to randomly reassign students from one
class to another, or from one school to another (cf. Sacerdote (2001)). This
may not be feasible in practice, but information from school splits and merg-
ers, or information collected on students’ school classes prior to and after
moving to another city or region might come close to the ideal. Another
potentially important piece of information usually not collected is on the
timing of activities. For example, if teenagers appear to smoke primarily
during weekdays and hardly during weekends, this would provide additional
information on the nature of their social interactions. More generally, re-
search on teenage behavior is likely to beneﬁt from matched data on parents
and children from the same sample of families.
As in the literature on intra-household decision making, employing non-
cooperative or cooperative solution concepts is crucial in any analysis of social
interactions. As yet, this issue has not been addressed in the empirical social
interactions literature. The fact that classmates interact daily, often for many
years, and become friends in many cases suggests that non-cooperative Nash
29equilibria are not necessarily plausible.
30Notes
1In addition to the research motivations to be mentioned here, researchers can be
motivated by personal circumstances. One researcher for whom this seems to be the case
is ESPE ’s ﬁrst president, Bernard van Praag. When he became a father in the early
seventies, he published on child beneﬁts and the costs of child care (Van Praag, 1970);
when his children were teenagers he published on teenage behavior (cf. Warnaar and Van
Praag, 1997); his recent work is on ageing and pension systems (Van Praag and Cardoso,
2003). I readily acknowledge that my choice for the topic of the present paper is partly
related to the fact that my own children are now teenagers.
2By ﬁrst discussing data and then theories the paper deviates from the protocol usually
adhered to in applied econometrics. However, ”there is ...an evolutionary interaction
between theory and data that is central to the act of creation of empirical knowledge. The
set of available models to analyze the data is never ﬁxed in advance of looking at it. The
data may suggest new models and the models may in turn suggest new data – or more
careful examination of old data – in the light of new theoretical advances.” (Quoted from
Heckman and Neil (1996)).
3Variations in regional representation of schools and changes in the questions and coding
make it diﬃcult to compare sample averages across years. For example, for some time use
categories, the 1990 survey had categorized responses for hours per day [0, 0-1, 0-2, ...,
9-10, >10], the 1992 and 1994 surveys had responses based on hours plus quarters per day,
while the surveys as of 1996 had responses based on hours plus minutes per day. I opt for
the 1992 data because this year had the most extensive questionnaire.
4This ’one-factor’ correlation structure is equivalent with the formulation ik = µk+ηik,
where µk is a class-speciﬁc error term with variance σ2
µ, and ηik an individual error term
with variance σ2
η; all error terms uncorrelated. Then ρ = σ2
µ/(σ2
µ + σ2
η) for two students
from the same class and ρ = 0 for two students from diﬀerent classes.
51 guilder≈0.57 USD in 1992.
6All results reported on discrete choices (truancy, smoking, cell phone ownership,
moped ownership, and asking permission for expenditures) are taken from Soetevent and
Kooreman (2004).
7Identiﬁcation is based on the problematic assumption that perceived behavior is not
determined by actual behavior.
8In view of the average number of students within a class, one could in principle estimate
the model separately for each class, and hence make all the parameters class-dependent.
This makes the issue of identiﬁcation diﬀerent from the case considered by Moﬃtt (2001);
in his case the assumed availability of only two observations per group precludes the
estimation of group speciﬁc parameters.
9With respect to the literature on school quality and educational attainment recent
research reports the usefulness of taking a broader view on child development than merely
in terms of cognitive performance as measured by test scores. Kuhn and Weinberger (2002)
and Heckman (2003) stress the importance of non-cognitive skills such as leadership and
31personal discipline as predictors for labor market success later in life. Non-cognitive skills
are even more likely to be important predictors when using a broader deﬁnition of success
and performance, such as well-being or happiness.
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35Table 1: Sample statistics
min mean median max st. dev. fraction zeros
Time use
Sleep 35.0 59.1 59.5 91 6.9 0.000
Eating/personal care 0.0 9.5 7.0 35 5.9 0.026
School 14.0 38.2 38.0 70 6.7 0.000
Jobs 0.0 4.5 2.0 54 5.6 0.343
Household chores 0.0 4.4 3.5 35.8 5.3 0.252
Going out 0.0 4.8 4.0 40 5.2 0.297
TV/video/computer 0.0 20.6 17.5 119 15.14 0.029
Reading 0.0 5.8 3.5 35 5.6 0.145
Music 0.0 0.9 0.0 28 2.3 0.748
Sports 0.0 3.3 2.0 21 3.5 0.243
Income
Income from parents 0.0 115.3 80 1200 114.6 0.070
Income from jobs 0.0 144.8 78 2567 198.4 0.248
Expenditures and savings
Clothing and shoes 0.0 42.7 0.0 400 63.6 0.521
Alcohol 0.0 32.3 0.0 425.7 63.7 0.608
Savings 0.0 52.7 25 1000 83.9 0.190
Self-esteem and well-being
Self-esteem 0.0 4.64 5 6 1.46 0.007
Well-being 1.0 5.03 5 6 0.87 0.000
Student and family characteristics
Girl 0 0.481 0 1 0.500
Age 11.0 15.6 16 23 1.63
Non-Dutch 0 0.0410 0 1 0.198
Single parent 0 0.0655 0 1 0.247
Family size 1 4.28 4 4 0.992
Urbanization 1 3.18 3 5 1.34
School level 1 (MAVO) 0 0.292 0 1 0.455
School level 2 (HAVO) 0 0.237 0 1 0.425
School level 3 (VWO) 0 0.214 0 1 0.410
Father’s hours of work 0 41.2 40 70 14.2
Mother’s hours of work 0 18.7 18 70 15.9
Father’s college degree 0 0.221 0 1 0.415
Mother’s college degree 0 0.105 0 1 0.307
Protestant 0 0.227 0 1 0.419
Catholic 0 0.368 0 1 0.482
Time use: hours spent per week during a normal school week
Income and expenditures: guilders per month (1 guilder≈0.57 USD in 1992)
Self-esteem and well-being: see section 2 for deﬁnitions
36Table 2: Reduced form regressions; time use (t-values in parentheses)
Sleep Eating/ School Jobs Household
personal care chores
Constant 81.2 5.8 42.6 -9.4 8.0
(58.0) (4.6) (21.4) (-7.0) (4.8)
Girl 0.40 0.68 1.05 -0.57 0.62
(1.9) (3.3) (5.2) (-3.3) (2.6)
Age -1.29 0.171 -0.370 0.84 -0.13
(-17.7) (2.5) (-3.2) (12.3) (-1.5)
Non-Dutch -2.00 -0.62 -0.64 -1.55 2.39
(-3.4) (-1.0) (-1.0) (-3.4) (4.0)
Single parent -1.41 0.96 -0.30 -0.14 1.91
(-3.2) (2.4) (-0.6) (-0.4) (4.5)
Family size -0.119 0.130 -0.15 0.25 0.21
(-1.2) (1.2) (-1.3) (4.0) (2.3)
Urbanization -0.047 0.062 -0.110 0.00 0.10
(-0.5) (0.7) (-1.1) (0.0) (1.2)
School level 1 -0.093 -0.123 1.96 -1.11 -1.33
(MAVO) (-0.2) (-0.4) (4.1) (-2.6) (-3.6)
School level 2 -0.975 0.416 3.13 -1.26 -2.2
(HAVO) (-2.3) (1.3) (5.7) (-2.9) (-6.6)
School level 3 -1.60 0.341 3.93 -1.93 -3.0
(VWO) (-3.7) (1.0) (7.2) (-3.7) (-7.7)
Fathers hours of work -0.014 0.006 -0.00 0.015 -0.00
(-1.6) (0.7) (-0.4) (2.4) (-0.0)
Mothers hours of work -0.009 -0.004 -0.011 0.029 0.01
(-1.2) (-0.6) (-1.5) (4.9) (1.8)
Father’s college degree -0.203 0.244 -0.03 -0.40 0.00
(-0.7) (0.9) (-0.1) (-1.7) (0.6)
Mother’s college degree -0.41 -0.050 0.06 -0.02 0.20
(-1.1) (-0.1) (0.2) (-0.1) (0.4)
Protestant 0.196 -0.464 0.19 0.17 -0.19
(0.6) (-1.6) (0.6) (0.8) (-0.8)
Catholic 0.212 -0.149 0.41 0.16 -0.44
(0.8) (-0.6) (1.4) (0.7) (-1.6)
ˆ σ2 39.5 31.3 40.5 25.1 25.9
(51.3) (52.3) (47.6) (65.2) (63.8)
ˆ ρ 0.030 0.007 0.121 0.067 0.010
(2.8) (1.0) (8.7) (7.1) (0.8)
37Reduced form regressions; time use (continued)
Going out TV/Video Reading Music Sports
computer
Constant -10.0 28.9 6.7 0.54 4.3
(-7.8) (11.7) (4.5) (0.9) (4.8)
Girl 0.19 -2.14 0.31 -0.15 -0.93
(1.1) (-5.7) (1.4) (-1.6) (-7.2)
Age 0.93 -0.243 0.01 0.00 -0.06
(14.9) (-1.9) (0.0) (0.1) (-1.3)
Non-Dutch -0.19 2.09 0.05 -0.15 -0.05
(-0.4) (2.2) (0.0) (-0.6) (-0.1)
Single parent 0.72 -0.73 -0.02 -0.08 -0.35
(2.2) (-0.9) (0.0) (-0.4) (-1.4)
Family size -0.08 -0.36 0.16 0.01 -0.13
(-1.2) (-1.9) (1.4) (0.1) (-2.1)
Urbanization 0.06 7 -0.41 -0.04 0.04 -0.00
(0.9) (-2.4) (-0.6) (1.1) (-0.1)
School level 1 -0.88 -2.58 -0.35 0.06 0.40
(MAVO) (-2.9) (-4.2) (-1.0) (0.4) (1.9)
School level 2 -1.14 -5.07 -0.70 0.30 0.62
(HAVO) (-3.7) (-8.1) (-2.0) (2.0) (2.8)
School level 3 -1.94 -7.2 -0.80 0.29 0.82
(VWO) (-6.0) (-10.3) (-3.3) (2.0) (3.7)
Fathers hours of work 0.023 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 0.016
(3.7) (1.3) (-0.7) (-0.3) (3.3)
Mothers hours of work 0.023 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(4.4) (-0.0) (0.3) (0.1) (-0.8)
Father’s college degree 0.142 -1.5 0.16 0.44 -0.16
(0.5) (-2.4) (0.5) (4.1) (-0.9)
Mother’s college degree 0.291 -0.49 0.33 -0.02 0.46
(0.9) (-0.7) (0.9) (-0.1) (2.2)
Protestant -0.414 -1.21 0.89 0.01 -0.17
(-1.8) (-2.5) (3.3) (0.9) (-1.0)
Catholic -0.209 -0.52 -0.71 0.07 0.11
(-1.0) (-1.0) (-2.1) (0.6) (0.8)
ˆ σ2 21.3 112.3 29.1 5.4 11.6
(49.8) (52.3) (55.2) (70.2) (51.6)
ˆ ρ 0.052 0.031 0.009 0.004 0.027
(3.8) (3.1) (0.9) (0.5) (3.2)
38Table 3: Reduced form regressions; income (t-values in parentheses)









Single parent 49.90 13.42
(3.9) (1.1)




School level 1 -4.91 -35.50
(MAVO) (-0.3) (-3.0)
School level 2 -7.03 -36.47
(HAVO) (-0.6) (-2.9)
School level 3 -18.6 -56.01
(VWO) (-1.5) (-4.6)
Fathers hours of work 0.24 0.71
(1.1) (2.6)
Mothers hours of work 0.67 0.92
(3.3) (4.7)
Father’s college degree 18.1 -6.15
(2.4) (-0.7)






ˆ σ2 11935 28856
(42.3) (88.0)
ˆ ρ 0.059 0.029
(2.5) (3.1)
39Table 4: Reduced form regressions; expenditures and savings (t-values in
parentheses)
Clothing Cosmetics Alcohol Savings
and shoes
Constant -127.9 -24.6 -179.8 -55.77
(-7.5) (-9.1) (-11.9) (-2.1)
Girl 16.90 6.37 -20.95 -14.92
(7.3) (13.1) (-9.6) (-4.6)
Age 10.79 1.83 13.57 7.76
(13.2) (12.1) (17.6) (5.7)
Non-Dutch 13.67 2.79 -13.04 -16.11
(3.4) (3.1) (-2.2) (-1.2)
Single parent 7.92 1.86 1.04 -10.14
(1.7) (2.2) (0.2) (-1.2)
Family size 0.09 0.10 1.06 0.94
(0.1) (0.5) (1.2) (0.5)
Urbanization -2.84 -0.16 0.96 0.05
(-3.6) (-0.9) (1.2) (0.0)
School level 1 -2.69 -1.17 -16.39 -8.50
(MAVO) (-0.7) (-1.6) (-4.1) (-1.7)
School level 2 3.24 -1.02 -12.64 -22.74
(HAVO) (0.9) (-1.5) (-3.2) (-3.5)
School level 3 -2.27 -2.07 -20.96 -22.98
(VWO) (-0.5) (-3.2) (-4.5) (-3.8)
Father’s hours of work -0.02 0.00 0.33 -0.01
(-0.2) (0.2) (4.3) (-0.1)
Mother’s hours of work 0.31 0.04 0.18 0.31
(3.9) (2.6) (2.5) (2.9)
Father’s college degree 1.21 -0.60 -0.52 -3.12
(0.4) (-0.7) (-0.2) (-0.6)
Mother’s college degree -2.07 -0.45 1.59 4.01
(-0.5) (-0.4) (0.4) (0.6)
Protestant -1.58 -0.08 -3.15 3.09
(-0.5) (-0.1) (-1.0) (0.6)
Catholic -5.09 -1.02 0.80 5.69
(-1.9) (-1.6) (0.3) (1.4)
ˆ σ2 3264 131.6 3067 5877
(59.2) (123.8) (76.5) (86.2)
ˆ ρ 0.019 -0.011 0.056 0.004
(2.1) (-1.6) (5.4) (0.5)











Single parent -0.11 -0.17
(-1.1) (-2.9)




School level 1 0.17 -0.09
(MAVO) (1.9) (-1.5)
School level 2 0.26 -0.20
(HAVO) (2.6) (-3.2)
School level 3 0.34 -0.11
(VWO) (3.3) (-1.8)
Father’s hours of work 0.00 0.00
(1.1) (0.2)
Mother’s hours of work -0.00 0.00
(-0.9) (-0.4)
Father’s college degree 0.17 0.00
(2.2) (0.1)






ˆ σ2 2.02 0.70
(30.6) (43.7)
ˆ ρ 0.027 0.010
(2.4) (1.2)
41Table 6: Model with endogenous interactions (t-values in parentheses)
ˆ γ ˆ ρ ˆ σ2
Time use
Sleep 0.066 0.018 39.4
(0.7) (0.9) (51.5)
Eating/personal care - - -
School 0.256 0.036 38.3
(2.3) (1.1) (37.8)
Jobs 0.237 0.015 24.8
(3.3) (0.9) (64.8)
Household chores - - -
Going out 0.133 0.022 21.0
(1.7) (1.1) (51.5)
TV/video/computer 0.161 0.000 112.3
(1.9) (0.0) (52.3)
Reading - - -
Sports - - -
Income
Income from parents 0.341 0.000 11618
(5.8) (-) (49.7)
Income from jobs 0.144 0.005 28818
(1.9) (0.4) (88.5)
Expenditures and savings
Clothing and shoes 0.126 0.000 3241
(1.7) (-) (61.8)
Alcohol 0.309 0.000 2912
(7.0) (-) (78.6)
Savings 0.125 0.000 5755
(1.3) (-) (86.0)
Self-esteem and well-being
Self-esteem -0.133 0.056 2.04
(0.6) (1.1) (26.3)
Well-being 0.171 0.000 0.697
(2.7) (-) (43.1)
42Table 7: Goodness-of-ﬁt (R2)
Model without endogenous Model with endogenous
social interaction social interactions
Time use
Sleep 0.166 0.168
Eating/personal care 0.090 -
School 0.092 0.140
Jobs 0.210 0.220
Household chores 0.061 -





Income from parents 0.092 0.116
Income from jobs 0.267 0.268
Expenditures and savings






43Table 8: Intra-gender and cross-gender interactions (t-values in parentheses)
ˆ γ ˆ γBB ˆ γBG ˆ γGB ˆ γGG p-value
Time use
Sleep 0.066 - - - - -
(0.7)
Eating/personal care - - - - - -
School 0.256 0.217 0.234 0.249 0.257 0.545
(2.3) (1.5) (1.9) (1.8) (2.2)
Jobs 0.237 0.582 0.367 0.048 0.266 0.000
(3.3) (11.6) (2.7) (0.5) (3.0)
Household chores - - - - - -
Going out 0.133 0.149 0.348 -0.054 0.169 0.054
(1.7) (1.6) (3.1) (-0.4) (1.7)
TV/video/computer 0.161 0.185 0.200 0.155 0.100 0.730
(1.9) (1.9) (1.6) (1.5) (0.9)
Reading - - - - - -
Sports 0.145 0.194 0.023 0.200 0.006 0.195
(1.9) (2.1) (0.1) (1.6) (0.4)
Income from parents 0.341 0.392 0.254 0.147 0.135 0.421
(5.8) (4.0) (1.3) (1.0) (0.8)
Income from jobs 0.144 0.321 0.282 -0.022 0.126 0.000
(1.9) (3.9) (2.3) (-0.2) (1.0)
Expenditures and savings
Clothing and shoes 0.126 0.142 -0.081 0.339 0.190 0.116
(1.7) (1.4) (-0.6) (2.2) (1.8)
Alcohol 0.309 0.271 1.337 -0.766 0.468 0.000
(7.0) (3.8) (11.5) (-9.4) (3.5)
Savings 0.125 - - - - -
(1.3)
Self-esteem and well-being
Self-esteem -0.133 -0.191 -0.225 -0.111 -0.105 0.761
(0.6) (-0.7) (-0.8) (-0.5) (-0.4)
Well-being 0.171 0.176 0.192 0.140 0.171 0.321
(2.7) (1.7) (1.8) (1.8) (2.2)
44Table 9: Intra-gender and cross-gender interactions; discrete choices
(t-values in parentheses)
ˆ γBB ˆ γBG ˆ γGB ˆ γGG
Truancy 0.880 0.533 0.569 0.765
(4.7) (2.1) (2.6) (4.6)
Smoking 0.829 0.535 0.465 1.171
(6.8) (3.5) (2.9) (10.3)
Cell phone 0.562 0.434 0.467 0.830
(5.1) (2.8) (2.7) (8.2)
Moped 0.486 0.497 0.346 0.153
(2.4) (2.0) (1.1) (0.6)
Asking permission 0.303 0.082 0.128 0.220
(2.1) (0.5) (0.8) (2.0)
Source: Soetevent and Kooreman (2004)
45